States and international, regional and transnational actors are key actors in the governance of im/mobility.
States and international, regional and transnational actors are key actors in the governance of im/mobility.
Anderson, B. (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, chapter three, Verso
Cohen, S. (2011) Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Routledge, chapter 3.
Downing, J and Husband, C., (2005) Representing Race: Racisms, Ethnicity and the Media, Sage, chapter one
Hall, S. et al, (2013) Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, Chapter four
Edward Said, (2008) Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, chapter one.
In this lecture we are going to discuss post-war immigration and settlement to England (a narrower focus than the UK, and introduce some of the key postcolonial perspectives that help illuminate the im/mobilities, political and media discourse and im/mobility policies that developed in this post 1945 period.
Immigration prior to WWII
Prior to the second world war, England was already a country of immigration. This was mainly due to its status as one of the nations of the United Kingdom (England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales) and its marginalisation of the Irish through a form of quasi-colonisation.
The prevailing racism of English attitudes to immigrants became evident in its response to Jewish immigration during the second world war, and afterwards.
By the 1940s, there were approx. 400,000 refugees from Nazi germany. They came despite the Aliens Act (1905) which was designed to restrict Jewish immigration (particularly the immigration of poor Eastern European Jews).The British government limit the offer of protection to the amount of refugees that Jewish organisations were prepared to fund. It refused to extend this policy to the general population (as members of the public had offered to support Jewish refugees) as the effect would have been an extension rather than limitation of support.
Between 1933 and 1948 Britain limited Jewish immigration
In 1939 only ten per cent of refugee applicants were successful. Eastern European political refugees preferred over Jewish persons
Post-war immigration (1945 +)
Need to build post-war economy after loss of world power status to US
European ‘push’ factors for post war migration
War time migration & settlement
1938-45: 70,000 into England & Wales.
1946-59: 350,000 Irish workers (net inflow)
European labour migration between 1946 -51 brought in 460,000 European migrants.
New Commonwealth migration Push & Pull factors
West Indies. Unemployment, population growth, and the cutting of alternative outlets for migration;Late 1940s + West Indians began to emigrate to escape chronic unemployment, poverty, and violent levels of socio-political unrest. West Indians migrated to the US, within the Caribbean itself, and to Canada and Britain.
Indian and ‘Pakistani’ people migrated after the partition of 1947 which caused the displacement of I5 million people; many from Sikh communities from the Punjab where they had been driven by the annexation of ‘West Pakistan’.
Job opportunities and better opportunities and prospects in Britain, opportunity to support family via remittances. Zig Layton-Henry
remittances that migrants sent home during this period rapidly became a dominant form of GNP in the Caribbean nations; i.e., second highest component for Jamaica 1948-1951.
New Commonwealth & varied immigration
Today approx. 5.5. million UK citizens live abroad
Four phases of immigration policy in the UK
Four phases of immigration policy
Restricting irregular immigration & settlement
Explanations for restrictions:
Unintended consequences: changing demography & identities
Multi-ethnic UK and Europe
Contested racialisation of immigration
“the state, employer and worker came to adhere to a common belief in British nationalism underpinned by a shared allegiance to whiteness”. Virdee, Satnam.(2016. 99).
an exponential growth in street-level racism and violence directed against blacks and Asians accompanied by the introduction of racist immigration controls by the state. Virdee, 2016. 99-100.
Anti-immigrant racism at work and in public
Consequences of discrimination Late 1940s-1960s
Race Relations Paradigm in sociology
Alibah-Brown, Yasmin, Who Do We Think We Are? Imagining the New Britain (London, 2001).
Ê. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (1991), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, London, Verso Books (1991)
Benedict Anderson, (2016), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition, London, Verso.
Bloch, A. and L. Schuster. 2002. Asylum and Welfare: contemporary debates. Critical Social Policy. 22(3), pp.393-414.
Bleich, Erik, Race Politics in Britain and France (Cambridge, 2003).
Ann Dummett and Michael Dummett, ‘The role of government in Britain’s racial crisis’, in C. Husband, (ed.), ‘Race’ in Britain: Continuity and Change, London, Hutchinson, 1982
Fryer, Peter, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain (London, 1984).
Geddes, Andrew, The Politics of Immigration and Race (Manchester, 1996).
Gilroy, Paul, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London, 1987).
Goulbourne, Harry, Race Relations in Britain since 1945 (Basingstoke, 1998).
Hansen, R. ‘Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons’, Political Quarterly (2003), 74, 1, pp 25–38.
Heffer, S (1998). Like the Roman: the life of Enoch Powell. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration, ‘Race’ and ‘Race’ Relations in Post-War Britain, Oxford, Blackwells, 1992
Louise London (2001) Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
Tony Kushner, Katherine Knox, (1999) Refugees in an Age of Genocide, London: Frank Cass
Tony Kushner, (2009),Anglo-Jewry Since 1066: Place, Locality and Memory, Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Miles, R. 1982. Racism and Migrant Labour. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Miles, Robert, Racism after Race Relations, Routledge, London, 1993
Kathleen Paul, (1997) Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era, Ithica and London, Cornell University Press
T. H. Marshall (1987), Citizenship and Social Class, London, Pluto Press
Phizacklea, A. and Miles, R. 1980. Labour and Racism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Rosemary Sales (2007) Understanding Immigration and Refugee Policy, Bristol: Policy Press)
Sivanadan, A, Refugees from globalism, CARF 57, August/September, 2000
Solomos, J. 2003. Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain, 3rd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Satnam Virdee (2014) Racism, Class, and the Racialised Outsider, London, Palgrave Macmillan
An antidote to the far right’s poison’? ?– the battle for Cable Street’s mural’, The Guardian, September 21, 2016
People in the US similarly overestimate the proportion of Muslims in the population, thinking it is 15% when it is actually 1%. They believe 56% are Christian when the true figure identifying themselves as such is 78%.Britons also underestimate the proportion of Christians, believing it is 39% when the correct figure is 59%.
IPSO MORI cited in The Guardian, Today’s Key Fact: you are probably wrong about almost everything, 29 October, 2014
London 1,012,823 (12.4%); Birmingham 234,411 (21.8%);Bradford 129,041 (24.7%)
Leicester (19%); Manchester 79,496 (15.8%) ONS (2011)
Amsterdam (14%); Antwerp (17%); Brussels (15+%); Cologne (12%); Copenhagen (10%); Malmo (20%); Marseille (20%); Moscow (12%); Paris (10+%)
e.g. after the January 2015 Paris attack 26 mosques attacked (firebombs, gunfire, pig heads, and grenades) (Stone, 2016).
Muslims tend to be ghettoized, living in often run-down Muslim banlieues, isolated from mainstream society
French policy: racism, ethno-religious discrimination
Article 1. France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. Constitution of France (1958)
… the proclaimed universalism of republican values, and in particular laïcité, can very quickly resemble the ‘civilizing mission’ of colonialism. … if Muslims want to be ‘French’, they must learn to be citizens of the Republic first and Muslims second; for many this is an impossible task. Hussey, 2014, 9.
Muslims viewed as Non-assimilating
Our former immigrants were Europeans; these are not. Arab girls who insist on wearing chuddars (chador, veil or covering) in our schools are not French and don’t want to be…Europe’s past was white and Judaeo Christian. The future is not. I doubt that our very old institutions and structures will be able to stand the pressure (Dominique Moisi, in Judith Miller, 1991, p.86)
Banning Islamic Female Dress
‘Conspicuous’ religious items may not be worn in schools. Forbidden items include: the Muslim headscarf, Sikh turbans, Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crucifixes.
Burqa and Niqab banned in public 2011
April, France bans public wearing of the burqa, a full body covering that covers the lower face and has a meshed cloth over the eyes, and the niqab, which is identical except that a veil covers the lower face and the eyes are uncovered (fines of 150 euros).
Burkini Bans 2016
30 French mayors ban the use of Burkini; municipal police can stop and fine any women in full-body swimsuits at the beach
More than 20 mayors have defied the state council ruling that the burkini bans are a “serious and manifestly illegal violation of fundamental freedoms”.
Laïcité and the bans; “protecting” the secular nature of the state.
French colonialism & the Hijab
English policy: racism, ethno-religious discrimination
Race Relations Paradigm
Recognising religious discrimination
The Rushdie Affair
‘from the point of view of community relations, the fatwa was a disaster for the Muslims in Britain’ (Ruthven, 1991)
No one paused to inquire if book burning had the same meaning and significance in Islamic traditions, or whether the Bradford incident was largely symbolic, an expression of impatience rather than intolerance, and the result of misguided advice rather than hatred…all Muslims were implicated in the book burning (Parekh, 1990: 122).
‘The nature of the media coverage surrounding the ‘Rushdie Affair’ transformed the dominant view towards Muslims in Britain from Asians to Muslims.’ (Vertovec, 2002: 23)
Assimilationist and liberal British views
Disloyalty: greater respect for Khomeini than British law
Lack of patriotism; neglecting British reputation & feelings of fellow citizens
Fatwa support shows multiculturalism has failed
Violation of liberal values; free speech, respect for law, tolerance, democracy, secularism (Parekh, 1999, 18)
From Racism to Islamophobia
Islamophobic views of Islam
Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.
seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.
Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.
Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in ‘a clash of civilisations’.
Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.
Criticisms made by Islam of ‘the West’ rejected out of hand
Discrimination defended Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and ‘normal’.
“Anti-Muslimism” (Fred Halliday, 2006)
Relating to: terrorism, nuclear weapons, Oil; Arising from Western views of foreign Muslim societies
Relating to: Immigration, Assimilation, Cultural practices (veiling); Arising from the presence of Muslims within Western society
Anti-Muslimist Imagined Communities (Benedict Anderson)
Europe/West defined as “civilised”, “modern”, “tolerant”, “equitable” (feminist), lawful & peaceful
in relation to
Islam/East defined as “barbaric”, “backwards”, “intolerant”, “inequitable” (“sexist”), illegal & violent
Orientalism (Edward Said)
Colonial period: the dominant “orientalist discourse”
Al-Azmeh, Aziz, (1996)
Leiken, R S (2005) ‘Europe’s Angry Muslims’ in Foreign Affairs 84 (4) 120-135
Husband, C. and Alam, Y. (2011) Social Cohesion and Counter Terrorism: A Policy Contradiction? Bristol, Policy Press, (Ch. 4)
Al-Azmeh, Aziz, (1996), Islams and Modernities (Verso)
Barker, M (1981) The New Racism, London, Junction Books
Cherribi, Sam (2010). In the House of War: Dutch Islam observed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fekete, Liz, 2009, A Suitable Enemy, Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe (Pluto).
Field, D. (2007) ‘Islamophobia in contemporary Britain: the evidence of the pinion polls, 1988-2006’, Islam and Christian Relations, Vol. 18, No. 4, 447-77.
Halliday, F (1996) Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, London, I.B. Taurus.
Holloway, Lester, Islamophobia – 20 years on, still a challenge for us all, Runnymede Trust, online, 13 April, 2016
Huntingdon, S (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Hussey, Andrew (2014). The French Intifada. London, Granta Publications
Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood, 2012, “For ‘Jewish’ read ‘Muslim’? Islamophobia as a Form of Racialisation of Ethno-Religious Groups in Britain Today”, Islamophobia Studies, volume 1, issue 1 (spring).
Miller, Judith, (1991) “Strangers at the Gate: Europe’s Immigration Crisis,” New York Times Magazine, September 15
Tariq Modood, (ed.,) (2005), Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, London, Zed Books
Modood T, and Salt, J. (2011) (eds.), Global Migration, Ethnicity and Britishness, London & New York, Palgrave MacMillan
Nachmani, Amikam (2010). Europe and its Muslim minorities: aspects of conflict, attempts at accord. Brighton: Sussex Academic.
Kastoryano, Riva. “Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany”, International Migration Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration (2004), pp 1234-1255.
Kastoryano, R (2006) ‘French secularism and Islam: France’s headscarf affair’ in Modood, T. Trianafyllidou, A., and Zapata-Barrero, R. Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship, London, Routledge, 57-69.
Kundnani, Arun, 2014, The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, Verso.
Plenel, E (2016) For the Muslims: Islamophobia in France, Brooklyn NY. Verso.
Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia, A Challenge for Us All, 1997
Said, E, (2003) Orientalism, Penguin, London
Soysal, Y. N. (1997), ‘Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-making: Organized Islam in European public spheres’, Theory and Society, 26, 509-527.
In today’s lecture we will discuss:
What is the far right? Definitions, examples & Characteristics
How the far right relates to im/mobility. How the far right relates to immigration and settlement, the immobile and mobile precarity of its constituents, the agent mobility of more elite nationals, and the relationships between the three groups and their territorial and social im/mobilities.
Far Right Definitions
Whether due to the complexity of the phenomenon or simply due to its national specificity, the far right has defied a common definition.
Mudde (1996): Twenty six definitions of ‘extreme right’ and 58 different features of ‘extreme right’ ideology’
‘There are as many differences as there are similarities within the extreme right party family’ (Schain et al. 2002).
Socio-economic and democratic crisis in Europe
Extremism in Europe
Normalisation: extremist views becoming mainstream in successful political movements/parties
Parties share two features:
Fierce opposition to immigration and rising ethnic cultural diversity
Their pursuit of a populist ‘anti-establishment’ strategy that attacks mainstream parties and is ambivalent if not hostile to liberal representative democracy(Goodwin, 2011)
The populist right has been emboldened by the vote for Brexit and the success of Donald Trump in the US, while the far-right Freedom party is challenging for the presidency in Austria this weekend and Marine le Pen’s Front National is expecting to do well in French elections next year
Like Marine Le Pen’s Front National, the Freedom party has actively tried to distance itself from its antisemitic past since at least 2010, when it joined a cross-party alliance in the European parliament with Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom and Italy’s Northern League. Contacts with openly antisemitic parties such as Hungary’s Jobbik were broken off, a delegate expelled for antisemitic remarks on her website, and ties built up to Israel’s rightwing Likud party – the Israeli government, however, continues to reject all official contacts with the Freedom party.
Germany’s AfD is not Hungary’s Fidesz. The Finns and the Danish People’s party loathe France’s Front National, and the Netherlands’ PVV is nothing like Poland’s Law and Justice, which bears no resemblance to Austria’s Freedom party. It may be misleading to bracket them all together in the same category.
Anti-Islamism in Netherlands
Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom
Campaigning for de-Islamification” banning all Islamic symbols, mosques and the Koran from the country.
“Europe is exploding. We have terror attacks by jihadists almost every week, almost every day,”
Twice charged with speech incited hatred (against Islam, against the Dutch Morrocan minority) claims he has a right to free speech
Kroet, C. (2016) Geert Wilders tells US he’s set to become next Dutch prime minister
Wilders traveled to the US to show his support for Donald Trump, Politico.eu., 7/20/16
Geert Wilders, the far-right politician who was acquitted five years ago of making anti-Islam remarks, has gone on trial again for allegedly inciting hatred against the Dutch Moroccan minority.
In January, Geert Wilders walked around a fish market in Rotterdam, handing women spray cans that promised to be “Islamic testosterone bombs.” The stunt followed right-wing furor in parts of Europe after migrants and asylum seekers were implicated by media (including social media) in a series of sexual assaults in major cities
Extremism in Greece: Neo-Nazi anti-semitism; anti asylum/refugees
Golden Dawn (7% vote, behind leftwing Syriza, New Democracy (Conservative)
Anti-asylum refugees & anti-austerity
Violent/criminal; accused of murder, armed attacks, money laundering and trafficking
Neo-Nazi & anti-semetic: Leader Nikos Michaloliakos wears swaztika tattoos; praised Hitler
AfG & Pegida in Germany
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West
Rallies against asylum refugees
Associated with burning of asylum hostels
Pegida leader Bachmann convicted and fined for inciting racial hatred after he called refugees “cattle” and “scum,
1,005 attacks on refugee homes in Germany in 2015 – five times more than in 2014.
Front National in France
’Marine le Pen, leader of the Front National, ran as 2017 candidate for Presidency. Party started by Jean Marie le Pen in 1972. Now seeking to overcome history of racism, anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism
In national elections, support for Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigrant, anti-euro Front National swung between 11% in 2002 to 4% in 2007 and nearly 14% in 2012. In recent European (24%) and regional (27%) elections it has done far better, but France’s two-round electoral system means it has yet to make a decisive breakthrough. Le Pen reached the run-off in the presidential elections but, like her father in 2002, was defeated.
Context: more than 230 people have been killed in Islamist terror attacks in France since January 2015; mass unemployment and economic stagnation
Anti-asylum in Italy
Matteo Salvini and the 5 Star Movement took government as a coalition in early 2018. Salvini is a far right figure who campaigned against immigration from Africa and the Middle East, and particularly against asylum immigration. since coming to power he has repeatedly blocked humanitarian immigration and won increasing support in Italy (as well as condemnation) for doing so. Salvini justifies his policies in terms of regional burden sharing (arguing that Italy takes an excessive share of “illegal” migrants) and by denigrating immigrants: he claims, for example, that immigrants are responsible for a third of all crimes in Italy. In the wake of Salvini’s campaing and government there has been a rise in violence against immigrants.
Xenophobia in the UK; from the BNP & EDL to UKIP & Brexit
British National Party (former leader Nick Griffin), Britain Democratic Party
English Defense League (leader ‘Tommy Robinson’)
South East Alliance, Combat 18, Britain First, Aryan Revolution UK, British Movement, National Action, National Front, Yorkshire Infidels
The BNP and EDL – have struggled with internal splits and the rise of UKIP
The BNP, lost most of its 58 councillors and two MEPs, has suffered since leader Nick Griffin was ousted and UKIP has drawn their votes on the basis of its anti-immigration & anti-EU stance
‘While Ukip is not the BNP and Farage is not Griffin, it is clear that most former BNP voters feel quite at home in the Ukip stable.’
English far right anti-Islamism
‘We asked 100 people what you associated with Islam. The highest score goes to “terrorism” (28); followed by paedophilia (25), then “hate preaching” (20), “unwelcome invaders” (10), “excessive breeders” (7) and goat/ camel fuckers (5).’ 136 people ticked ‘like’ (Pai, H 2016, 203-4).
Britain is “at war …I don’t think moderate Muslims exist. The jihadis are killing in the name of Islam, … They have no reason to be in this country whatsoever. They are vermin.’ Prodromou, leader, South East Alliance (Channel 4, 2015)
Our country will turn into Englandstan soon and I don’t want that at all.’ EDL member, (Pai, H. 2016, 203)
English Far right hate crimes & terrorism
Anti-Muslim hate monitoring group Tell MAMA reports 326 per cent increase in incidents in 2015, fueled by terrorist incidents; 61 per cent of victims in the cases it recorded involved women and of those, 75 per cent were clearly identifiable as Muslim, for example due to their headscarves or veils.
Recent study by the Royal United Services Institute accused western governments of neglecting the threat of far-right lone actor terrorists, with almost a third in Europe since 2000 having been motivated by extreme-right-wing beliefs, compared with 38% inspired by religion.
MP Jo Cox, advocate of support for immigrants, murdered by lone extremist Thomas Mair (Batley, 2016)
English far right online
Smith, M, Colliver, C (2016)
Redwatch forum for far-right, targeting left-wing, pro-immigrant support
Rise of the Alt-Right in the U.S.
if there is a single characteristic all far right parties share, it is nationalism (Ellinas, 2007)
(Greek) fear of strangers
Xenophobia in the context of post-racism
‘The ruling liberals are out of touch with public opinion. They just don’t understand what normal people think especially the middle and lower class’ (BNP member)
Pro-capitalist or welfare chauvinist
Insecure masculinity “Angry white men”
Violence is socio-structurally generated and individually psychologically justified
post industrialism and ‘globalisation’: changed structure of capitalist economies hurt particular segments of society. Most vulnerable social groups are thought to be the ones most likely to be swayed by far right appeals.
Repeated survey evidence suggested that far right voters are young, usually over represented among blue collar workers and small business owners.
Men are over represented in the far right vote, while women are under represented
Globalised uncertainty and insecurity contributes to calls for collective identification, self-defence, self-reassurance, leading to Far right voting (Ignazi, P , 2003: 210-2)
Michael Samers (1999) described populist xenophobic politics as providing a spatial vent. Populist politicians channel anxieties about the pressures of ‘globalization’ like under and unemployment into a form that blames the immigrant for their woes.
The term populism is prejudicial?
Populist politics is used to refer to discriminatory views, like anti-immigrant views, or supposedly unreasonable views, like protectionism or socialism. Is the term really just a way of saying popular views that ‘we’ don’t like? If so, who is the ‘we’ that used the term, and what are their investments? Is the term anti-democratic and elitist? Does it resonate with earlier patrician views denigrating ‘the rule of the mob’?
The Far Right and im/mobilities.
Far right politics seems to be embedded in the experience of sustained and inescapable precarity in the context of an inequality of mobilities. In England, for example, the experience of precarity includes resentment at de-industrialisation and financialisation, the privileging of London as a world/’global;’ city occuring in tandem with the marginalisation of former industrial strongholds, like West Yorkshire (see Townsend, 2016). Pressure on the welfare estate and working conditions in marginalised areas is viewed through a spatial vent (Samer, 1999) in which metropolitan elites are held responsible for unfair competition: the territorial and social mobility of immigrant groups is seen as being granted at the expense of the social mobility of local residents. The socio-economic and political capital and mobility of metropolitan professionals, tied in part to weakly regulated finance and trade, is also seen as being gained at the expense of a loss of agency over mobility among the precariat. This includes a loss of (upwards) social mobility, but also coerced displacement (for example, the need to move further from central areas like inner London, as well as well-performing rural cities and towns) because precarious wages are insufficient, and benefit conditions disallow housing in advantageous areas. Correspondingly, it is the most marginalised areas that typically receive the greatest number of immigrants requiring support (such as asylum seekers).
In these contexts liberal multiculturalism and support for immigration is viewed as a form of elite discrimination against those belonging to the precariat. Far right populists often appeal via cultural racism and xenophobia, but seek to do so in liberal (post-racist) forms that distinguish between a deserving (hardworking, liberal, Christian) national community and a forms undeserving illiberal other. This line of argument is directed at the liberal multicultural mainstream who are portrayed as unfairly (or treasonously) privileging the interests of dangerous others over the nation’s own deserving poor behind a rhetoric of anti-racism that disguises elite self-interest (both economic and symbolic/identitive).
Anderson, J. G. & Bjorklund, T. (2000) ‘Radical right-wing populism in Scandinavia: from tax revolt to neo-liberalism and xenophobia’ in Hainsworth, P. (ed.) The Politics of the
Extreme Right: from the margins to the mainstream. London: Pinter, 193-223.
Boomgaarden, Hajo G. and Rens Vliegenthart. (2007). ‘Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content.’ Electoral Studies 26(2): 404-417.
Davies, P. with Jackson, P. The Far Right in Europe: An Encyclopedia. Oxford: Greenswood World Publishing.
Goodwin, X (2011) ‘Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe’
Hale-Williams, M. (2010) ‘Can Leopards change their spots?: Between xenophobia and trans-ethnic populism among West European Far Right Parties, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 16(1), 111-134.
Harrison, S. and Bruter, M. Mapping Extreme Right Ideology: an empirical geography of the European extreme right. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hewitt, R. (2005) White Backlash and the Politics of Multiculturalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ignazi, P (2003) Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Lemos, G. (2005) The Search for Tolerance: Challenging and changing racist attitudes and behaviour amongst young people, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation,
Mammone, A. Godin, E. and Jenkins, B. (2012) Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: from local to transnational. London: Routledge
Mudde, C. (1995) ‘Right-wing extremism analyzed: A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties( NPD, NDP. CP’86)’, European Journal of Political Research, 27, 203-224.
Mudde, C. (1996) ‘The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family’, West European Politics 19(2), 225-248.
Pai, H. (2016), Angry White People: Coming Face-to-Face with the British Far Right, London, Zed Books.
Roxburgh, A. (2002) Preachers of hate: the rise of the far right. London: Gibson Square.
Runnymede Trust (1997) Islamophobia, a challenge for us all. London: Runnymede
Rhodes, J. (2009) “‘The Banal National Party: the routine nature of legitimacy’.” Patterns of Prejudice 43, no. 2: 142-160.
Rhodes, J. (2011) ‘It’s Not Just Them, It’s Whites as Well’: Whiteness, Class and BNP Support, Sociology, 45(1): 102-117.
Samers, M. (1999)“‘Globalization’ the geo-political economy of migration, and the‘spatial vent’”,Review of International Political Economy,6, 2: 163-196.
Schaine et al. (2002) Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Svasand, L. (2003) ‘Scandinavian Right-Wing Radicalism’ in Betz, H. G. and Immerfall, S. (eds) The New Politics of the Right.
Smith, M, Colliver, C (2016) The impact of Brexit on far-right groups in Britain, London, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
Sprague-Jones, J. (2011) Extreme right-wing vote and support for multiculturalism in Europe, Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(4): 535-555.
Treadwell, J. and Garland, J. (2011) Masculinity, Marginalization and Violence: A Case Study of the English Defense League, British Journal of Criminology, 51(4): 621-634.
Yilmaz, F. (2012) Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe, Current Sociology, 60(3) 368-381.
Non academic reading and viewing
Townsend, M (2016) Why has the far right made West Yorkshire a home?, The Observer, 18 June
The ancestors of modern Native Americans may have first entered the continent from Asia between 13,000 and 16,000 years ago via a thin land bridge that once ran across the Bering Sea, connecting Siberia and Alaska. Another possibility is that these early migrants may have voyaged down the Pacific coast by boat, and then moved into the continent’s interior.
Ancestors of the Native Americans gradually spread not only across North America, but also into Central and South America.
They divided into distinct tribes with unique cultural practices, religious beliefs, and methods of survival. These tribes had North America to themselves until the opening years of the seventeenth century (Hillstrom, 7).
The popular idea of America:
the ‘Land of the Free
‘Land of the Free’ a refrain from the US national anthem (Start Spangled Banner)
Immigration and emancipation (freeing the slaves) part of the founding myth of America
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”
Imagined community: US as a land of freedom, a nation of immigrants
Ideas about the nation are socially constructed
Migration to the US: industrialisation, urbanisation
20th-21st century globalisation, new industrial revolutions
Migration to US (2014)
Undocumented migrants in US
Total undocumented population 2010-2014
States with highest numbers
(Kennedy, 2010, 83)
America accepted 84,995 refugees in 2015-16.
Muslim citizens and refugees
Muslim 46% Christian 44% refugees
(Pew Research Center, 2016)
Trump and Mexican migration
Trump committed to building a wall between Mexico and the US
He committed to deporting undocumented migrants (to sending them back to Mexico and elsewhere)
He committed to removing birthright citizenship (where the children of migrants resident in the US are granted citizenship)
“When Mexico sends it people, they’re not sending their best. … They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (Trump, 2016).
Crowds at his political rallies chanted “build the wall”
Before the election Trump said there should be a complete ban on Muslim immigration
Trump, Terrorism, Muslims
Since the 1980s, many companies sourced labour in the countries experiencing the new industrial revolution, like China, India …
Often the same areas producing migration to the US
US Unemployment: who/what is to blame?
Terrorism: who/what is to blame?
Trump’s Protectionism: “Making America Great Again
Undocumented, Mexican, Muslim, refugee migrants, terrorists
Cobb, C. and Stuek, S. eds., (2005) Globalization and the American South, Athens, University of Georgia Press (Ch. 1)
Wacquant, L. (2009), Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, Durham & London, Duke University Press (Ch. 2)
Wacquant, L. (2008), Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality, Cambridge, Polity Press (Ch. 8)
Schueller, M.J. (2009) Locating Race: Global Sites of Post-Colonial Citizenship, Albany, State University of New York.
Bourguignon, F (2015) The Globalization of Inequality, New Jersey, Princeton University Press (Ch. 2).
Desmond, M. (2016) Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, London, Penguin.
Peterson, R.D. and Krivo, L.J. (2010) Divergent Worlds: Neighbourhood Crime and the Spatial-Racial Divide, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, (Ch. 2).
Kalleberg, A. (2011) Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in the United States, 1970s-2000s, New York, Russell Sage Foundation.
Sassen, S. (2013) ‘Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy’, (Ch. 1) Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, UK, Belknap Press, Harvard University.